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1. Introduction  
The existence of wage differentials between public and private sector workers and the 
analysis of its origin has received considerable attention over the last few decades (see, for 
example, Smith, 1976a, 1976b, Dustmann and van Soest, 1998 and Hartog and Oosterberck, 
1993 and, among more recent contributions, Lucifora and Meurs, 2006, Cai and Liu, 2011 and 
Chatterji et al., 2011). There are several reasons why the wages of public sector workers might 
potentially differ from those of their private sector counterparts. Among these reasons, particular 
emphasis has been afforded to such factors as the public sector’s monopoly power in its 
provision of public services and its potential impact on public workers’ wages; the presence of 
compensatory wage differentials of non-pecuniary working conditions and, the greater bargaining 
power of public workers resulting, among other circumstances, from their higher rates of union 
membership (Gregory and Borland, 1999 and Bender, 1998). Among the regularities identified in 
the large body of empirical studies that have addressed this issue in many countries, it should be 
stressed the existence, with few exceptions, of a public sector wage premium when comparing 
workers with similar productivity-related characteristics. Moreover, this premium is usually 
reported as being higher for women and low-skilled workers whereas, on the other hand, wage 
inequality levels tend to be comparatively smaller in the public sector (Gregory and Borland, 
1999). 
The aim of this article is to examine wage differentials between public and private sector 
workers in Spain, an economy where few analyses of this type have been undertaken to date 
(Lassibille, 1998, Albert et al., 1999, García-Pérez and Jimeno, 2007 and Hospido and Moral, 
2013). In addition to examining these differences by gender and across the whole wage 
distribution, a separate study is conducted for workers on permanent and fixed-term contracts, a 
clearly necessary analysis in the particular case of Spain’s labour market and which, to the best of 
our knowledge, has yet to be undertaken. Indeed, there are various reasons why the Spanish case 
constitutes an especially appropriate framework for conducting this type of analysis. Firstly, 
because the public-private sector wage gap in Spain is comparatively high from an international 
perspective, being ranked above the EU average (De Castro et al., 2013). Secondly, because in 
Spain, as in other European countries, in recent years the question of fiscal consolidation has 
been tackled specifically by adjusting public workers’ wages. Finally, because Spain presents a 
very high rate of fixed-term employment in both its private and public sectors [according to 
Eurostat, in the year covered by this study – that is, 2010, Spain had the highest rate of fixed-
term employment in the public sector in Europe (24.5%) and the second highest rate in the 
private sector (25.1%), being ranked well above the EU average of 13.9%, in both cases]. This is 
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due in the first instance to the very large discrepancy in the costs of terminating permanent and 
fixed-term contracts and to a business structure clearly geared towards low-tech production 
(Dolado et al., 2002 and Toharia et al., 2005) and, in the second, to elements such as budget 
constraints and structural weaknesses in the financing of the country’s local authorities (Consejo 
Económico y Social, 2005). 
The study employs various decomposition techniques and uses data from the 2010 wave 
of the Spanish Structure of Earnings Survey (Encuesta de Estructura Salarial), which provides the 
greatest public sector coverage. An additional feature of this source is that it is a matched 
employer-employee dataset, a type of data that has had a significant impact on wage 
determination analyses in general (Hamermesh, 2008 and Abowd and Kramarz, 1999) but whose 
use in the analysis of public-private sector wage differentials has been rare to date (among recent 
studies, only Chatterji, Mumford and Smith, 2011, and De Castro et al., 2013 use matched 
microdata). Among other advantages, the use of these data facilitates an examination of the 
contribution to public-private sector wage differentials of establishment characteristics, attributes 
that are often not given the necessary weight in this type of analysis. 
The obtained results reveal a significant wage differential in Spain in favour of public 
sector workers, a differential that is largely explained by the differences in the endowments of the 
observed characteristics of public and private sector workers, especially those of male employees. 
Likewise, establishment characteristics are found to make a significant contribution to the 
differential, greater than individual or job characteristics. Other notable findings include the 
presence of a positive wage premium associated with working in the public sector that is not 
explained by the endowments of productive characteristics in the case of low skilled workers and 
a negative premium for high skilled workers, and lower levels of wage inequality in the public 
sector that cannot be attributed to differences between the characteristics of these workers and 
those of the private sector. Finally, the evidence obtained also confirms that there are significant 
differences associated with the type of contract in relation to both the size of the wage gap 
between the public and private sectors and to its origin. Among these, the presence of significant 
differences in the size of the wage premium associated with working in the public sector should 
be stressed, since the premium is comparatively smaller for men on fixed-term contracts and for 
women on permanent contracts. 
The rest of the article is structured as follows. In the second section the literature 
examining wage differentials between the public and private sectors and by types of contract, is 
reviewed. The database used in the study is presented in the third section, while the fourth 
section focuses on the econometric methodologies used in the empirical analysis. The evidence 
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obtained is presented in the fifth section and the study finishes summarising the main 
conclusions. 
 
2. Literature review 
The analysis conducted in this study considers two strands of the empirical literature on 
wage differentials: on the one hand, that which for decades has analysed the public-private sector 
wage gap; and, on the other, the more recent strand that addresses the study of wage differentials 
by type of contract. 
2.1 Public-private sector wage differentials  
Numerous studies have undertaken analyses of the wage gap between the public and the 
private sectors in a broad manner, both temporally and spatially, since the seminal analyses of 
Smith (1976a, 1976b) for the United States. Those former studies estimate a Mincerian wage 
equation, using a dummy variable identifying public sector workers, and reveal the presence of a 
public sector wage premium. Despite their limitations, the same methodology has been applied in 
many subsequent studies in the field and these, with few exceptions, estimate a positive wage 
premium for public sector workers, a premium that is comparatively higher for women and in 
less developed countries (Giordano et al., 2011 and Depalo et al., 2013). Following the 
methodology proposed by Oaxaca and Blinder (Oaxaca, 1973 and Blinder, 1973), an alternative 
line of analysis has subsequently based its analysis on the decomposition of the wage gap between 
sectors into the effects attributable to differences in characteristics and in the returns to these 
characteristics (the latter component reflecting the wage premium paid by the public sector to 
workers with the same productivity-related characteristics as those of workers in the private 
sector). The results of this approach emphasize that the differences in these characteristics 
normally account for most of the public-private wage gap, but also confirm the presence of a 
positive public sector wage premium, which is greater for women (Belman and Heywood, 1988, 
Gunderson, 1979 and Rees and Shah, 1995). 
The presence of a possible selection bias arising from the fact that individuals who 
choose to work in the public sector may have unobservable characteristics that differ from those 
presented by private sector workers, led to the estimation of endogenous switching regression 
models (Hartog and Oosterbeck, 1993, Dustman and van Soest, 1998, Zweimuller and Winter-
Ebmer, 1994, Adamchick and Bedi, 2000 and Christopoulou and Monastiriotis, 2013). The 
results of such studies, however, do not always coincide, because while for most countries it is 
found that when controlling for selection bias the wage premium widens, in some cases the gap is 
closed and, moreover, the magnitude of the selection effect differs greatly between studies. This 
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may be related to the difficulty of accessing variables in the available databases that constitute 
credible exclusion restrictions and which allow the selection bias to be corrected (Siminski, 2013 
and Budría, 2010). To overcome this difficulty, some studies present evidence from longitudinal 
databases that use fixed effects to control for workers’ time invariant characteristics and which, at 
the same time, allow the researcher to work with the subsample of workers that switch sectors. 
The usual finding of these studies is that the size of the public sector wage premium falls 
considerably in relation to those obtained using cross-sectional data, to the point that the 
premium even disappears in some cases (Krueger, 1988, Bargain and Melly, 2008, Siminski, 2013 
and Campos and Centeno, 2012). 
The existence, in general, of a lower wage dispersion in the public sector implies, in turn, 
that the analysis of the average wage differential provides an incomplete view of the different 
processes of wage determination in the public and private sectors. This has led several authors to 
examine inter-sector wage differentials across the wage distribution using decomposition 
techniques of differences in wage distributions (Poterba and Rueben, 1994, Melly, 2005a, 
Christopoulou and Monastiriotis, 2013, Cai and Liu, 2011, Lucifora and Meurs, 2006 and Depalo 
et al., 2013). Their results largely coincide, confirming that, in general, the role of the 
characteristics varies at specific points in the wage distribution, so that the public sector wage 
premium is greater in the lower part of the distribution and becomes smaller in the higher 
quantiles, so as to at a given point the premium usually becomes negative. 
Finally, recent studies highlight the need to analyse wage differentials solely in the case of 
workers that are strictly comparable (that is, in the case of those whose observable characteristics 
are present in both the public and private sectors). These studies undertake their analyses 
employing the matching methodology proposed by Ñopo (2008), which allows the common 
support of the distributions and its impact on the decomposition of wage differentials to be 
established between sectors, and in some cases they find that the number of fully comparable 
individuals between the two sectors is very small (Ramoni-Perazzi and Bellante, 2006, Gimpelson 
and Lukiyanova, 2009 and Mizala et al., 2011).  
Compared to the vast body of international literature in this field, evidence of the public-
private sector wage gap in Spain is comparatively small and, with few exceptions, is not very 
recent. Thus, Lassibille (1998), Albert et al. (1999) and García-Pérez and Jimeno (2005 and 2007) 
have estimated endogenous regression models for various years between 1990 and 2001, and 
Giordano et al. (2011), Depalo et al. (2013) and De Castro et al. (2013) have included Spain in 
their comparative analyses of various European countries (in the latter case using the European 
Structure of Earnings Survey). There is a general consensus in their estimates of a high public sector 
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wage premium, always higher for women. Hospido and Moral (2013) obtain similar results using 
a different data source, the Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales. García-Pérez and Jimeno (2005), 
Depalo et al. (2013) and Hospido and Moral (2013) also estimate quantile regressions, obtaining 
similar results to those obtained for other countries, namely a lower wage premium in the upper 
part of the wage distribution. When differentiating the sample by skill level, Hospido and Moral 
(2013) in fact obtain a negative wage premium for high-skilled public sector workers located in 
the upper part of the wage distribution. 
2.2. Wage differentials between permanent and fixed-term workers 
The second line of analysis refers to wage differentials by type of contract. Studies in this 
field were first undertaken in the early nineties and interest has been particularly intense in recent 
years, focused above all in certain countries, mainly European, characterized by their high 
proportion of fixed-term contracts. The most commonly used methodology consists in 
estimating wage equations that incorporate a dummy variable to control for the type of contract 
and the usual finding is the presence in all economies of a wage penalty for fixed-term workers 
(Jimeno and Toharia, 1993, Blanchard and Landier, 2002 and Gustafsson et al., 2001). More 
recent studies have undertaken comparative analyses, finding that the size of the wage penalty for 
fixed-term workers presents a significant international heterogeneity, being of an intermediate 
size in the case of Spain (Brown and Sessions, 2005, Comi and Grasseni, 2009 and Boeri, 2011). 
Other studies that control for the selection of individuals according to contract type find that the 
wage penalty for fixed-term workers undergoes changes when introducing this control, albeit that 
the sign varies between studies (Picchio, 2006, Hagen, 2002 and Mertens et al., 2007). Finally,  
analyses in this line of research have been also undertaken across the entire distribution, with the 
finding that the wage penalty for fixed-term workers is usually greater in the lower part of the 
distribution (Mertens and McGinnity, 2004, Mertens et al., 2007 and Comi and Grasseni, 2009). 
Given the importance of fixed-term contracts in the Spanish labour market, this is 
unsurprisingly one of the countries in which wage differentials by type of contract have been 
studied most. Thus, Jimeno and Toharia (1993) and Hernanz (2003), when estimating wage 
equations with dummy variables for the type of contract, identify a wage penalty for fixed-term 
workers. Likewise, after undertaking a decomposition exercise, De la Rica and Felgueroso (1999) 
conclude that much of the observed differential can be attributed to the better characteristics of 
the permanent workers. Similarly, Hernanz (2003), De la Rica (2004) and Davia and Hernanz 
(2004) estimate endogenous regression models in seeking to correct any selection bias and their 
results confirm that fixed-term workers do not constitute a random sample. Indeed, Davia and 
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Hernanz (2004) report almost no discrimination and De la Rica (2004) finds a negative premium 
for those on fixed-term contracts of 10%. 
 
3. Data  
The source from which the microdata used in this study are drawn is the 2010 wave of 
the Structure of Earnings Survey (Encuesta de Estructura Salarial, hereinafter, EES). The EES is 
conducted by Spain’s National Statistics Institute in line with a standardised methodology for all 
EU countries. The survey includes wage earners that have contributed to the Social Security 
system throughout the whole month of October of the reference year and its design corresponds 
to a two-stage sampling of wage earners from the contribution accounts held by the Social 
Security. One of its most important features is, therefore, that it includes matched employer-
employee microdata (i.e., observations for various workers employed in each establishment).  
The EES consists of independent cross-sections that are produced every four years and at 
present four waves are available, corresponding to 1995, 2002, 2006 and 2010. The survey’s 
coverage has expanded over this period and, for the purposes of this research, it should be 
stressed that in 2010 it included for the first time the branch of activity corresponding to section 
O of the NACE-2009 classification: Public Administration and Defence; Compulsory Social 
Security (so that the wave covers establishments of all sizes affiliated to the general social security 
system whose economic activity falls under sections B to S of the NACE-2009 classification of 
economic activities). This branch of activity constitutes a sizeable part of the public sector, since 
the only other public sector workers in other branches of activity are those employed in publicly 
controlled firms. Consequently, the 2010 wave of the survey provides a comprehensive coverage 
of the public sector and one that is greater in all circumstances than that provided by previous 
waves, which explains why this empirical analysis is limited to the 2010 wave. In delimiting the 
public and private sectors, the study considers public sector workers as those that in the 
dichotomous variable “Ownership or Control of the Company” are included in the category 
corresponding to public ownership or control (as opposed to private). This includes all 
individuals employed in the branch of activity of Public Administration and Defence; 
Compulsory Social Security, as well as those employed in public enterprises in sections of activity 
other than these1.   
                                                 
1 Thus, the public workers considered in this study include all kinds of civil servants. However, note that it only 
includes those affiliated to the general social security system, and so it does not include, given that they do not form 
part of the EES, those affiliated to mutual societies or minority social security systems covering such areas as justice 
or the armed forces. 
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The data source provides very detailed information about the workers’ wages and 
characteristics (sex, age, education and nationality); about their jobs (occupation, tenure, type of 
contract, type of employment, be it part- or full-time, and the undertaking of supervisory tasks) 
and about the enterprises or establishments (sector of activity, size, type of collective agreement 
and region). Wage information includes the various components that make up the wage and 
covers different periods of time. The wage concept used in the empirical analysis is the gross 
hourly wage, calculated from the wage corresponding to the month of October, divided by the 
number of hours worked in that month2. Wages are expressed in gross terms and their calculation 
includes any payment made by the firm, including commissions, bonuses for working nightshifts 
or weekends, as well as overtime.  
In conducting the empirical analysis certain individuals were excluded, namely, those of a 
nationality other than Spanish, those under the age of 16 or over the age of 65 and those with hourly 
wages of less than two and a half or more than two hundred euros. The final sample from the 2010 
wave of the EES comprises 157,774 observations, 89,953 corresponding to men (71,428 on a 
permanent contract and 18,525 on a fixed-term contract) and 67,821 women (52,239 on a 
permanent contract and 15,582 on a fixed-term contract). Of these, 23,416 (14.8% of the total) work 
in the public sector – 10,067 men (11.2%) and 13,349 women (19.7%)3. The descriptive statistics of 
the sample can be consulted in Table A.1 in the Appendix. 
 
4. Methodology 
 The study employs three different techniques for the decomposition of the public-private 
sector wage differentials in Spain. The first, the Oaxaca-Blinder methodology (Oaxaca, 1973 and 
Blinder, 1973), allows a detailed decomposition of the average wage differential of individuals in 
both sectors. The second, a methodology proposed by Ñopo (2008), serves as a robustness check 
of the former, insofar as the decomposition takes into consideration the effect of the presence of 
individuals that share strictly the same observed characteristics. Finally, the third methodology, 
                                                 
2 October’s wage is taken as the reference, since being employed in that month is the requisite that defines the survey 
population. The total number of hours worked in that month is calculated as the worker’s normal working week in 
October multiplied by 4.35, plus the number of overtime hours worked. 
3 In order to examine the actual coverage of the public sector of the EES, a comparison was made with the Encuesta 
de Población Activa (using information corresponding to the third quarter of 2010 in the case of the EPA). When the 
comparison is restricted to the sectors covered by the EES, although the survey seems to suffer from a certain 
underestimation of the public sector, in general the coverage is high. Thus, public sector employees constitute 14.8% 
of all employees according to the EES and 22.2% according to EPA data, the percentages being 11.2% and 18.5% in 
the case of men and 19.7% and 26.7% for women. This underestimation of the public sector by the EES can be 
attributed to the fact that it does not include public sector workers affiliated to mutual societies and minority social 
security systems. 
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developed by Fortin, Lemieux and Firpo (2011), provides a detailed decomposition of the wage 
differentials across the wage distribution. The three techniques are described below. 
4.1. Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition 
The Oaxaca-Blinder technique is based on the separate estimation for each group of the 
Mincerian type semi-logarithmic wage equation of the form: 
iii Xw                                   (1) 
where wi corresponds to the logarithm of worker i’s gross hourly wage; Xi is a vector of individual 
explanatory variables plus a constant term;  is a vector of parameters and i is a random error 
term.  
The explanatory variables considered in the empirical analysis include individual 
characteristics as well as job and establishment characteristics. The former serve as controls for the 
highest level of education attained by an individual (distinguishing three categories: primary, 
secondary and tertiary education) and age (comprising three groups: under 30, between 30 and 45 
and over 45). The job characteristics include occupation (three categories corresponding to low-, 
medium- and high-skilled jobs, respectively); years of tenure in current job (differentiating four 
groups: 0 to 3 years, 4 to 10, 11 to 20 and more than 20 years); the type of contract (permanent or 
fixed-term); the type of employment (full-time or part-time) and the performing of supervisory tasks. 
Finally, the establishment characteristics include size (distinguishing four categories); the region of 
location and the type of collective agreement (distinguishing between single-establishment, national 
and sub-national sector agreements). 
After empirically estimating the wage structure of the labour market with the joint sample 
of individuals in the public and private sectors, and using the jointly estimated wage structure for 
the individuals of both sectors as the reference wage structure in the decomposition (see Oaxaca 
and Ransom, 1994 and Neumark, 1988)4, depending on the properties of the ordinary least 
squares estimator, the difference in the average wage of the public and private sectors () can be 
decomposed as follows: 
 )ˆˆ()ˆˆ(ˆ)()( *** pubprivprivpubprivpubprivpub XXXXWW   --              (2) 
where pubW  and privW  are the average public and private sector wages; pubX  and privX  are the 
average observed characteristics of the individuals in both sectors and pubˆ , privˆ  and *ˆ  are the 
                                                 
4 The estimation of the reference wage structure also includes a dummy variable for the group membership of each 
observation, since failure to do so can lead to a bias in the decomposition, given that the characteristics component 
may be overstated and the corresponding returns understated, as a result of the omission of group-specific intercepts 
(Elder et al., 2010).  
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coefficients estimated following the wage regression on the set of explanatory variables for the 
public and private sectors and the two sectors pooled, respectively. 
The first component on the right-hand side of equation (2) represents the effect on the 
average wage differential of the differences in characteristics (or the “explained” component), 
while the second corresponds to the effect of the coefficients (or the “unexplained” component). 
It should also be noted that this procedure provides a detailed decomposition (i.e., distinguishing 
the contribution of each individual explanatory variable to the differential to be explained, 
differentiating, in turn, between the corresponding effects associated with endowments and 
returns). To avoid the identification problem that arises in this type of decomposition, associated 
with the fact that the choice of a specific reference in each group of explanatory dummy variables 
can in practice affect the results of the detailed decomposition through the relative contribution 
of each explanatory variable to the returns component (Oaxaca and Ransom, 1999), when 
estimating the equation the strategy of normalization of dummy variables suggested by Yun 
(2005) was adopted, which allows the actual contribution of each variable to the returns 
component of the decomposition to be estimated. 
4.2. Ñopo decomposition 
Ñopo (2008) proposes an alternative method to that of the Blinder-Oaxaca 
decomposition which, using a non-parametric approach based on matching techniques, 
emphasizes the differences between the groups being compared in the supports of the 
distributions of observable characteristics and their impact on the results of the decomposition. 
The assumption is that, as there may be differences in the observable characteristics of the 
workers in both sectors that lead to particular combinations of characteristics for which identical 
individuals cannot be found in both sectors, the results of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition 
could be affected. This would occur to the extent that this technique assumes that estimates of 
the wage equations are also valid out of the support of the observable characteristics for which 
they are estimated, which would ultimately lead to an overstatement of that part of the wage 
differential unexplained by differences in the endowments of characteristics. Accordingly, a 
decomposition is proposed that breaks down the differential wage to be explained into four 
terms, two of which are analogous to the elements of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition (but 
computed only over the common support of the distributions of characteristics), while the other 
two account for differences in the supports. 
Thus, in line with this methodology (for more details see Ñopo, 2008), and taking as our 
starting point equation (2), the public-private sector wage differential can be expressed in terms 
of four additive elements: 
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UNEXPPRIVPUBEXP  )(          (3) 
where EXP is the part of the average public-private sector wage gap () that can be explained 
by differences in the distributions of the characteristics of workers in the public and private 
sectors over the common support; PUB is the part of the wage gap that is explained by the 
existence of public sector employees that are not present in the common support of the 
distributions of characteristics and PRIV is the part of the wage gap that can be explained by 
the presence of private sector workers out of the common support. Finally, UNEXP is the 
unexplained part of the wage gap (i.e., that part of the difference that is attributed to 
unobservable characteristics or to different returns between the two groups in the observable 
characteristics). By analogy with the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, the sum of the first three 
elements corresponds to the component “explained” by differences in the characteristics, while 
the fourth term corresponds to the “unexplained” component.  
To be able to apply this procedure, Ñopo (2008) proposes applying matching methods to 
simultaneously identify the common support (those groups of workers in the public and private 
sectors with similar observable characteristics) and decompose the wage differential in line with 
equation (3) without imposing any restrictions on the way in which the explanatory variables 
affect the dependent variable. A notable feature of this method is that the results of the 
decomposition tend to coincide with those obtained with the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition 
when the common support includes all the individuals analysed (i.e., if PUB and PRIV take a 
null value) (Ñopo, 2008). However, its main drawback is that it can be affected by the ‘curse’ of 
high dimensionality, since the inclusion of a large number of explanatory variables for matching 
can substantially reduce the number of observations found in the common support. 
4.3. The Fortin-Lemieux-Firpo decomposition 
Fortin, Lemieux and Firpo (2011) have recently proposed a technique for empirically 
decomposing differences between two distributions of a variable. Ultimately, it provides a 
decomposition of the differences that exist between the distributions in the value of any 
distributional statistic, such as the value of a quantile or an inequality index, depending on the 
differences in observable characteristics and in the returns to these observables, respectively. It is 
a procedure that has a notable advantage over comparable techniques proposed in the economics 
literature and which also allow empirical decompositions of differences between distributions 
based on the construction of counterfactual distributions (DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux, 1996, 
Juhn, Murphy and Pierce, 1993, Machado and Mata, 2005 and Melly, 2005b, 2006). Thus, while 
these techniques consist of aggregate decompositions which, with some partial exceptions, 
provide only the separate effects of the set of characteristics and returns, Fortin, Lemieux and 
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Firpo’s (2011) technique provides a detailed decomposition that allows, in addition, knowledge of  
the individual contribution of each explanatory variable considered in the analysis via the     
characteristics and returns components. 
This technique is based on the estimation of a regression in which the independent 
variable (the wage) is replaced by a wage transformation, the recentered influence function 
(hereinafter, RIF), so as to be able to undertake a standard Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of any 
distributional statistic based on the regression results (for further details, see Fortin, Lemieux and 
Firpo, 2011). The decomposition takes the following form: 
 )ˆˆ()ˆˆ(ˆ)( *** pubQQprivQprivQpubQprivpubQ XXXX    -                              (4) 
where 
Q
  is the difference in the quantile Q  (or, as stated before, in any other statistic) of the 
wage distributions of the public and private sectors; pubX  and privX  are the average observed 
characteristics of the public and private sectors and pubQˆ , 
priv
Q
ˆ  and *ˆ

 Q  are the coefficients estimated 
after the regression of the RIF variable of the quantile Q  on the set of explanatory variables for 
the public sector, private sector and the two sectors pooled, respectively5. The first component of 
the right-hand side of the equation represents the effect on the differential between distributions 
caused by differences in characteristics (the “explained” component), while the second 
corresponds to the effect of the coefficients (the “unexplained” component) and, as noted above, 
in each of them the contribution of each individual explanatory variable can be distinguished. 
 
5. Results 
5.1. Descriptive evidence  
Table 1 and Figure 1 contain information on the wage differential observed between the 
public and private sectors in Spain, measured in logarithms of hourly wages and expressed in a 
disaggregated form for male and female workers and, within these groups, for those on 
permanent or fixed-term contracts. They show a highly significant differential in favour of public 
sector workers, and one that is substantially higher for women (0.463 log points) than it is for 
men (0.352 points). A similar differential is found in favour of workers on permanent contracts 
(with a gap of 0.377 points for men and 0.497 for women) in comparison with workers on fixed-
term contracts (0.314 and 0.461, respectively). Furthermore, the wage differential between the 
two sectors is also found not to be homogenous across the whole wage distribution, it being 
                                                 
5 In conducting the decomposition the same methodological decisions have been taken as with the Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition with regard to such aspects as the reference wage structure and the normalisation of the dummy 
variables. 
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relatively lower in the two tails of the distribution than in the central part. This occurs regardless 
of the gender of the workers but not of the type of contract, because the wage differential, unlike 
the rest, presents in general an increasing profile for individuals on fixed-term contracts. 
 
FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE 
 
TABLE 1 AROUND HERE 
 
Table 2 contains information on wage inequality in both sectors, measured using the Gini 
coefficient. The table shows that inequality levels are systematically lower in the public sector 
than they are in the private, regardless of the gender of the workers. This is the case, however, 
only of individuals on permanent contracts, since, by contrast, in the case of workers on fixed-
term contracts there are no statistically significant differences in wage inequality between the two 
sectors at conventional levels. 
 
TABLE 2 AROUND HERE 
 
Table A.1 in the appendix contains the descriptive statistics for the sample used in the 
analysis. These statistics reveal significant differences in the characteristics of workers employed 
in the public and private sectors. Without seeking to be exhaustive, the public sector workers 
have on average, irrespective of their sex and contract type, higher levels of education, work 
experience (proxied by age) and length of tenure; they are characterized by their greater presence 
in occupations requiring high-skill levels, in full-time work and on fixed-term contracts, and the 
majority work in large establishments covered by single-establishment collective agreements. 
5.2. Econometric decompositions: average wage differentials  
Table 3 contains the results of the decomposition of the average public-private sector 
wage differential obtained with the Oaxaca-Blinder technique. The information includes the size 
of the average wage differential, the values of the two components on the right-hand side of 
equation (2), and the detailed results for each of the two components (characteristics and 
coefficients) based on the contribution of each individual explanatory variable. A positive value 
for any of these components indicates that it is an element that originates a positive wage 
differential for individuals working in the public sector.  
 
TABLE 3 AROUND HERE 
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Based on the results of the decomposition, in the case of men, the bulk of the average 
public-private sector wage differential (0.352 log points) is explained by differences in the 
endowment of characteristics (0.312), the contribution of the unexplained component – or wage 
premium – being much less relevant (0.041). This holds true for employees on permanent 
contracts and for those on fixed-term contracts. Thus, among permanent workers in both sectors 
there is an average wage differential of 0.378 log points, 0.311 of which are explained by the 
characteristics component, so that the estimated wage premium would be 0.067 points. In the 
case of fixed-term workers, characteristics explain 0.281 of the 0,314 points of difference, and so 
in this case the public sector wage premium (0.033 points) is lower than that of the permanent 
workers. The results of the detailed decomposition show that although several individual 
variables exhibit a significant explanatory power (including the level of education6, tenure and 
occupation), the establishment characteristics play a prominent role. Thus, size alone explains a 
third of the characteristics component for all male workers (this proportion being slightly lower 
for men on fixed-term contracts) and, overall, the failure to consider the establishment 
characteristics means that the part explained by the characteristics falls from 0.312 to 0.169 log 
points. 
The average wage differential for women (0.463 log points) can also largely be explained 
by differences in the endowment of characteristics (0.325). However, the wage premium in this 
case (0.138) is comparatively more significant than that of male workers, with a premium that 
more than triples that of their male counterparts. Unlike the men’s, the women’s wage premium 
is particularly high for workers on fixed-term contracts (0.214 points), and is significantly higher 
than that of permanent employees (0.126). Here, the individual variables with a notable 
explanatory power coincide with those for the male workers (most obviously education, length of 
tenure, occupation, and establishment size), although in this case the characteristics of the 
establishments have a less notable relative weight. 
The results obtained up to this juncture allow us to conclude that in Spain there are 
significant wage differentials between workers in the public and private sectors, both for all the 
workers and distinguishing in terms of contract type, while the bulk of the differential can be 
explained by differences in observed productivity-related characteristics. However, there may be 
                                                 
6 The distribution of the population by level of education can affect the wage structure of an economy not only 
through the wage differentials between levels of education, but also through the differences in wage dispersion that 
occur within them, to the extent that in most countries wage dispersion tends to be higher among individuals with 
higher levels of education (Martins and Pereira, 2004, Buchinsky, 1994 and Gosling et al., 2000). Budría and Moro-
Egido (2008) show that this situation is intensified in the specific case of Spain through educational mismatches, 
since they tend to increase wage inequality within each group and, moreover, their impact tends to grow significantly 
over time. 
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differences in the observable characteristics of the workers in the two sectors that lead to 
combinations for which it is not possible to find identical individuals, and this may well affect the 
results of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition. For this reason, and in order to check the 
robustness of the evidence obtained, Ñopo’s (2008) methodology was used, the results of which 
are presented in Table 4 based on a consideration of different groups of characteristics. Thus, 
first the individual characteristics (age and education) are considered; followed by the variables 
related to the job (tenure, type of employment, type of contract, tasks of supervision and 
occupation) and, finally, those relating to the characteristics of the establishment (region, firm 
size and type of collective agreement). In addition to the four elements of the equation (3), Table 
4 also shows the percentage of workers in the public and private sectors that form part of the 
common support (CSPUB and CSPRIV, respectively). 
 
TABLE 4 AROUND HERE 
 
It is found that the percentage of workers included under the common support remains 
at a high level (quite close to 1) until the characteristics of the establishments are considered, 
when the percentage falls substantially. The most important component of the wage differential 
up to this point is the unexplained portion (∆ UNEXP), which accounts for about two thirds of 
the total differential, but when the establishment’s characteristics are considered the contribution 
of this component falls significantly. The wage premium attributable to the public sector is, in 
fact, substantially lower according to the results of this method (being almost null in the case of 
men and presenting a value of 0.087 points in the case of women, which contrast with the values 
of 0.041 and 0.138, respectively, obtained with the Oaxaca-Blinder technique). The evidence also 
suggests that the main explanatory component when considering the set of independent variables 
arises from the existence of private sector workers that remain out of the common support as 
they have no counterpart in the public sector (∆ PRIV). In any case, these results serve to 
reinforce the consideration that the characteristics of the establishments are a noteworthy 
determinant of the public-private sector wage differential. 
5.3. Econometric decompositions: differentials across the wage distribution 
               The next step in the empirical analysis involves examining the origin of the wage 
differentials between sectors across the whole wage distribution. To do this, the evidence obtained 
after applying the methodology proposed by Fortin, Lemieux and Firpo is presented. Tables 5-7 and 
Figures 2-4 contain the results (shown separately for each of the groups considered in the 
decomposition of the public-private sector differential) for the Gini coefficient and the logarithm of 
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the hourly wage by quantiles. To facilitate presentation, Figure 2 distinguishes only between the 
aggregate contribution of the characteristics and returns components, while Figures 3 and 4 show 
the detailed results of the individual effects of each of the explanatory variables associated with the 
two components. Here again, to facilitate presentation, the explanatory variables are grouped into 
individual characteristics (age and education), job characteristics (tenure, contract, employment type, 
supervision and occupation) and establishment characteristics (the remaining variables considered).  
 
TABLES 5 TO 7 AROUND HERE 
 
FIGURES 2 TO 4 AROUND HERE 
 
The evidence shows that the causes of the observed wage differential between all the 
workers of the public and private sector differ significantly across the wage distribution (the results 
being relatively similar for men and women). Thus, the contribution of the differences in the 
endowment of characteristics is relatively low on the left-hand side of the distribution, which 
presents a clearly upward profile, so that there is a particularly strong influence in the right tail 
(Figure 2). The contribution of the unexplained component, meanwhile, presents a downward 
profile, to the extent that it acquires negative values in the upper part of the distribution. These 
results suggest, therefore, that while the comparatively less-skilled individuals receive a significant 
positive wage premium in the public sector, the most highly skilled individuals receive a lower wage 
than the one they would obtain in the private sector with their observed characteristics. 
When distinguishing by type of contract, however, the results are found to differ for fixed-
term workers and permanent employees, albeit that the latter’s results largely coincide with those of 
the overall analysis. These differences are particularly marked in the case of women on fixed-term 
contracts, for whom the contribution of both components is very similar across virtually all the 
distribution (with the exception of its two tails). Thus, the wage premium of fixed-term workers in 
the public sector is relatively homogeneous across the entire distribution (except for the first decile 
of the distribution, in which it is smaller). In the case of men on fixed-term contracts, the 
component explained by characteristics presents a growing weight across virtually the entire 
distribution, while the wage premium is relatively stable in the lower half of the distribution, falling 
thereafter to become negative in the upper quartile. 
In short, in line with the evidence presented in previous studies for both Spain and other 
countries, the wage premium paid by the public sector is higher for low-skilled workers, and this 
premium decreases as we move towards higher levels in the wage distribution, becoming clearly 
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negative for the most highly skilled employees. However, the analysis conducted here reveals a new 
result, as the fall in the wage premium for the high-skilled workers is not so clear in the case of those 
on fixed-term contracts, since among the male workers it is only recorded in the upper half of the 
wage distribution, and it is not observed at all for women on fixed-term contracts.  
              The results of the detailed decomposition of the characteristics component (Figure 3) 
confirm that the establishment characteristics present a more significant contribution across the 
wage distribution than the respective contributions of individual or job characteristics to the public-
private sector wage differential in the case of men, while for women their influence is relatively 
similar to those of the other characteristics. They also show that the upward profile observed for the 
whole set of the characteristics component is repeated in all the subsets of the explanatory variables. 
The detailed decomposition of the wage premium components (Figure 4) points to some additional 
issues of interest. Thus, for both sexes the wage premium associated with individual characteristics is 
positive for fixed-term workers, while it is negative for permanent employees. The analysis that does 
not differentiate by type of contract presents a result that clearly disguises a number of competing 
situations. The wage premium when controlling for job characteristics is positive for men and 
negative for women, because of the significant negative wage premium received by fixed-term 
workers in the public sector associated with these characteristics. Finally, the wage premium when 
controlling for the establishment characteristics is only slightly significant for all groups, except that 
of low-skilled men in stable employment. 
Finally, evidence regarding the origin of the differences in the public-private sector wage 
inequality (Table 7) reveals that the lowest levels of inequality in the public sector cannot be 
explained by a composition effect, since the relative endowments of characteristics presented by 
individuals in the public sector are a factor that, ceteris paribus, would lead to greater wage inequality in 
all the groups analysed. Thus, the origin of this phenomenon is fully explained by the contribution of 
the returns component (again across all groups, with the exception of fixed-term female workers, for 
whom this component is not statistically significant). As such, this evidence suggests that the lower 
wage inequality in the public sector is attributable solely to the differences in the wage-setting 
mechanisms of the private sector. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This study has analysed public-private sector wage differentials in Spain employing 
matched employer-employee microdata obtained from the most recent wave of the Structure of 
Earnings Survey (Encuesta de Estructura Salarial). In addition to examining these differences 
separately by gender and across the wage distribution, a separate analysis is conducted here for 
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the first time examining the wage gap between workers on permanent and fixed-term contracts in 
both sectors. This situation has not been studied to date, and is justified, among other factors, by 
the fact that the high number of fixed-term contracts in both the private and public sectors 
makes the Spanish labour market quite distinct in comparative terms. 
The empirical analysis of the origin of the wage gap between sectors has been undertaken 
employing various decomposition techniques. The results of this analysis show that, in line with 
evidence from previous studies, the bulk of the significant wage differential observed in Spain in 
favour of public sector workers can be explained by their different endowments of observed 
characteristics, while the size of the resulting pay premium is appreciably higher in the case of 
women. The evidence obtained also suggests that the establishment characteristics make a greater 
contribution to the differential than individual or job characteristics. This is confirmed by 
implementing the procedure proposed by Ñopo (2008), the results of which suggest that the 
failure to consider the establishment characteristics most likely causes an overestimation of the 
public sector wage premium. It is also found that the origin of the total wage differential between 
the public and private sectors differs significantly across the wage distribution, increasing on the 
left-hand side and decreasing on the right, so that in Spain, in common with other countries, 
there is a positive wage premium associated with working in the public sector for low-skilled 
individuals, while a negative wage premium is found in the case of the high-skilled workers. 
Finally, the lower levels of wage inequality observed in the public sector cannot be explained by 
differences in the characteristics of workers in the public and private sectors, but seem to be 
attributable to the particularities of their wage-setting mechanisms. 
The evidence obtained also confirms that there are significant differences associated with 
the type of contract with regards to both the size of the wage gap between the public and private 
sectors and to its origin. Thus, in relation to the first difference, it is observed that the wage 
differential in favour of the public sector is comparatively higher for permanent workers; that the 
wage differential presents an increasing profile for individuals on fixed-term contracts but, on the 
contrary, is decreasing for those on a permanent contract, and that the highest levels of wage 
inequality in the public sector occur only in the case of individuals on a permanent contract. In 
relation to the second point, significant differences are found by type of contract in the size of 
the wage premium (the premium being comparatively lower for individuals on fixed-term 
contracts in the case of men and for those on permanent contracts in the case of women) and in 
the origin of the wage differential between sectors across the wage distribution (highlighting the 
relatively homogeneous wage premium across the wage distribution that is observed for women 
on fixed-term contracts). 
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The analysis inevitably suffers certain limitations that, due to the characteristics of the 
database used, cannot be addressed. The first concerns the possible selection bias associated with 
the choice of sector (public or private) made by the workers, and which stems from the 
possibility that this decision is related to unobserved characteristics that simultaneously affect 
wages. The method usually employed to correct this problem (the estimation of endogenous 
switching models) requires, however, the use of credible exclusion restrictions, which are always 
difficult to achieve and that are not actually available in the Encuesta de Estructura Salarial. 
Likewise, to the extent that this information source is composed of cross-sectional data, it is not 
possible to control for the unobservable heterogeneity of individuals, something that many 
previous studies have achieved by introducing individual fixed effects in the context of panel 
data, or to examine the wage impact associated with a change of sector. 
To conclude, in the period following the specific year covered by this study (that is, 
2010), significant changes have occurred in the Spanish economy affecting wages in both the 
public and private sectors. In the case of the former, public sector wages have been affected by 
severe adjustments implemented within a framework of fiscal consolidation. They may also have 
been affected by the great number of job losses – a phenomenon limited to the private sector at 
the beginning of the economic crisis – that have subsequently been recorded in the public sector. 
In the case of the latter, the intense regulatory changes in collective bargaining that constituted 
part of the 2012 labour reform may well have meant significant changes to wage determination 
processes, especially in the private but also in the public sector. As such, it would be of 
undoubted interest to consider in the future the evolution of public-private sector wage 
differentials in Spain in the period immediately following the one examined in this article. 
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FIGURES AND TABLES 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Public-private sector wage differentials across the wage distribution. 
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Figure 2. Aggregate decomposition of the public-private sector wage differentials. 
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Figure 3. Detailed decomposition of the public-private sector wage differentials. Effect of the characteristics. 
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Figure 4. Detailed decomposition of the public-private sector wage differentials. Effect of the coefficients. 
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Table 1. 
Public-private sector wage differentials in Spain. 
 Male  Female  
 All  Permanent  Fixed-term All  Permanent  Fixed-term 
Average  0.352  0.377 0.314  0.463  0.497 0.461 
percentiles       
10 0.327 0.404 0.168 0.429 0.506 0.329 
20 0.382 0.434 0.223 0.463 0.516 0.394 
30 0.416 0.450 0.290 0.489 0.534 0.418 
40 0.431 0.468 0.342 0.514 0.543 0.456 
50 0.441 0.449 0.372 0.529 0.550 0.493 
60 0.413 0.407 0.388 0.538 0.556 0.549 
70 0.370 0.370 0.414 0.529 0.556 0.581 
80 0.328 0.316 0.393 0.489 0.489 0.558 
90 0.265 0.245 0.417 0.383 0.375 0.555 
Notes: The table shows the public-private sector differential of the logarithm of the hourly wage. 
 
 
Table 2. 
Public-private sector wage inequality in Spain.  Gini coefficient.  
 Male  Female  
 All Permanent   Fixed-term   All Permanent   Fixed-term   
Public sector 0.089 0.080 0.104 0.089 0.081 0.099 
Private sector  0.109 0.109 0.100 0.109 0.110 0.096 
Differential  -0.020* -0.029* 0.004 -0.020* -0.029* 0.003 
* Indicates that the difference between the two sectors is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 3. 
Decomposition of the public-private sector wage differentials. Average wages and the Oaxaca-Blinder technique. 
  Male  Male: permanent  
Male: 
fixed-term  Female 
Female: 
permanent 
Female: 
fixed-term  
Total Public sector  2.659 2.723 2.462 2.558 2.620 2.434 
  (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.012)*** (0.005)*** (0.006)*** (0.008)*** 
 Private sector  2.306 2.345 2.148 2.095 2.122 1.974 
  (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.005)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.007)*** 
 Differential  0.352 0.378 0.314 0.463 0.498 0.461 
  (0.006)*** (0.007)*** (0.013)*** (0.006)*** (0.007)*** (0.011)*** 
 Characteristics  0.312 0.311 0.281 0.325 0.372 0.247 
  (0.006)*** (0.007)*** (0.014)*** (0.006)*** (0.007)*** (0.014)*** 
 Coefficients 0.041 0.067 0.033 0.138 0.126 0.214 
  (0.006)*** (0.007)*** (0.016)** (0.006)*** (0.007)*** (0.013)*** 
Characteristics  Age  0.017 0.019 0.009 0.012 0.018 0.004 
  (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)* 
 Education  0.054 0.046 0.069 0.068 0.064 0.080 
  (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.007)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.005)*** 
 Tenure  0.057 0.061 0.043 0.067 0.088 0.042 
  (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.005)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.005)*** 
 Contract  -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.003 0.000 0.000 
  (0.000)** (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)*** (0.000) (0.000) 
 Employment type (full-/part-time) 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.003 0.006 -0.005 
  (0.000)** (0.000)*** (0.000) (0.001)* (0.001)*** (0.003) 
 Supervisory tasks  -0.004 -0.004 0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.000 
  (0.001)*** (0.001)** (0.000) (0.000)** (0.001) (0.000) 
 Occupation  0.032 0.026 0.052 0.051 0.056 0.038 
  (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.006)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.004)*** 
 Region -0.007 -0.009 -0.002 -0.008 -0.010 -0.001 
  (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.002) (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.002) 
 Size  0.104 0.105 0.086 0.095 0.107 0.053 
  (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.007)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.007)*** 
 Type of collective agreement 0.058 0.062 0.024 0.042 0.042 0.036 
  (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.009)** (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.007)*** 
Coefficients Age  0.072 -0.111 0.058 0.005 -0.092 0.034 
  (0.013)*** (0.009)*** (0.016)*** (0.011) (0.008)*** (0.019)* 
 Education  0.070 -0.049 -0.049 0.394 0.094 0.244 
  (0.015)*** (0.011)*** (0.017)*** (0.014)*** (0.019)*** (0.013)*** 
 Tenure -0.001 -0.003 0.064 0.010 -0.007 0.065 
  (0.000) (0.002) (0.019)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.025)** 
 Contract  0.034 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.000 
  (0.004)*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)*** (0.000) (0.000) 
 Employment type (full-/part-time) 0.031 -0.028 0.039 0.030 0.011 0.032 
  (0.010)*** (0.024) (0.008)*** (0.006)*** (0.010) (0.005)*** 
 Supervisory tasks  0.022 0.017 0.007 0.013 -0.008 0.059 
  (0.010)** (0.011) (0.032) (0.012) (0.012) (0.034)* 
 Occupation  -0.008 -0.016 0.026 -0.021 -0.028 0.009 
  (0.004) (0.006)** (0.009)*** (0.005)*** (0.006)*** (0.008) 
 Region -0.001 -0.007 0.019 -0.013 -0.019 0.008 
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.009)* (0.005)** (0.004)*** (0.013) 
 Size -0.036 -0.030 -0.032 -0.028 -0.042 -0.003 
  (0.013)** (0.015)* (0.022) (0.010)*** (0.014)*** (0.013) 
 Type of collective agreement 0.054 0.054 0.042 0.040 0.042 0.032 
  (0.007)*** (0.008)*** (0.014)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)*** (0.008)*** 
 Constant -0.198 0.241 -0.142 -0.299 0.175 -0.266 
  (0.031)*** (0.037)*** (0.057)** (0.026)*** (0.031)*** (0.053)*** 
N  89.953 71.428 18.525 67.821 52.239 15.582 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 4. 
Decomposition of the public-private sector wage differentials. Average wages and the Ñopo’s technique. 
Men   Women  
All: Differential 0.352  EXP  PUB  PRIV  UNEXP CSPUB CSPRIV  All: Differential 0.463  EXP  PUB  PRIV  UNEXP CSPUB CSPRIV 
Individual characteristics  0.187 0.000 0.000 0.165 1.000 0.999  Individual characteristics  0.224 0.000 0.000 0.239 1.000 1.000 
+ Job characteristics  0.138 0.001 0.001 0.212 0.993 0.951  + Job characteristics  0.193 0.002 0.010 0.259 0.985 0.936 
+ Establishment characteristics  0.073 -0.014 0.291 0.002 0.769 0.140  + Establishment characteristics  0.122 -0.014 0.268 0.087 0.675 0.123 
Permanent: Differential 0.378  EXP  PUB  PRIV  UNEXP CSPUB CSPRIV  Permanent: Differential 0.497  EXP  PUB  PRIV  UNEXP CSPUB CSPRIV 
Individual characteristics  0.162 0.000 0.000 0.215 1.000 0.999  Individual characteristics  0.222 0.000 0.000 0.275 1.000 1.000 
+ Job characteristics  0.139 0.000 0.006 0.233 1.000 0.947  + Job characteristics  0.214 0.000 0.014 0.270 1.000 0.926 
+ Establishment characteristics   0.095 0.004 0.287 -0.009 0.870 0.154  + Establishment characteristics  0.136 0.004 0.282 0.076 0.789 0.128 
Fixed-term: Differential 0.314  EXP  PUB  PRIV  UNEXP CSPUB CSPRIV  Fixed-term: Differential 0.461  EXP  PUB  PRIV  UNEXP CSPUB CSPRIV 
Individual characteristics  0.198 0.001 0.000 0.115 0.998 0.999  Individual characteristics  0.217 0.000 0.000 0.244 0.997 0.999 
+ Job characteristics  0.197 0.013 -0.021 0.125 0.972 0.966  + Job characteristics  0.245 0.012 -0.002 0.205 0.956 0.983 
+ Establishment characteristics   -0.036 0.058 0.198 0.093 0.462 0.085  + Establishment characteristics 0.136 0.027 0.148 0.150 0.445 0.102 
Notes: Individual characteristics include age and education; job characteristics include tenure, contract, type of employment, supervisory tasks and occupation; establishment characteristics include all the other variables: region, size and 
collective agreement type. CSPUB and CSPRIV represent, respectively, the proportion of workers in the public and private sectors that form part of the common support. 
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Table 5. 
Decomposition of the public-private sector wage differentials. Quantiles and the Fortin-Lemieux-Firpo technique. Men. 
  All  Permanent contract holders  Fixed-term contract holders  
  10th 
percentile 
Median 
90th 
percentile  
10th 
percentile  
Median 
90th 
percentile  
10th 
percentile  
Median 
90th 
percentile  
Total Public sector 2.134 2.655 3.204 2.234 2.715 3.228 1.909 2.433 3.073 
  (0.009)*** (0.008)*** (0.011)*** (0.009)*** (0.008)*** (0.013)*** (0.016)*** (0.014)*** (0.025)*** 
 Private sector 1.807 2.214 2.939 1.831 2.265 2.983 1.741 2.061 2.655 
  (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.006)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.007)*** (0.006)*** (0.005)*** (0.014)*** 
 Differential  0.327 0.441 0.265 0.404 0.449 0.245 0.168 0.372 0.417 
  (0.010)*** (0.008)*** (0.013)*** (0.010)*** (0.009)*** (0.014)*** (0.018)*** (0.015)*** (0.029)*** 
 Characteristics  0.090 0.321 0.487 0.113 0.356 0.440 0.052 0.229 0.616 
  (0.006)*** (0.007)*** (0.014)*** (0.007)*** (0.008)*** (0.015)*** (0.015)*** (0.012)*** (0.036)*** 
 Coefficients 0.237 0.120 -0.222 0.291 0.094 -0.195 0.116 0.143 -0.198 
  (0.010)*** (0.008)*** (0.016)*** (0.011)*** (0.009)*** (0.017)*** (0.024)*** (0.015)*** (0.043)*** 
Characteristics Age  0.004 0.014 0.033 0.005 0.017 0.037 0.006 0.009 0.015 
  (0.002)** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)** (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.004)*** 
 Education  0.020 0.046 0.104 0.017 0.042 0.084 0.025 0.072 0.125 
  (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.006)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.020)*** 
 Tenure 0.036 0.055 0.075 0.039 0.065 0.075 0.028 0.030 0.073 
  (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.005)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.005)*** (0.006)*** (0.005)*** (0.014)*** 
 Contract -0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.001)* (0.000)*** (0.001)* (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 Full-/part-time 0.005 0.002 -0.003 0.010 0.005 -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 0.003 
  (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
 Supervisory tasks  -0.001 -0.004 -0.007 -0.002 -0.004 -0.006 0.000 0.000 0.001 
  (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.002)** (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) 
 Occupation 0.008 0.035 0.052 0.008 0.032 0.035 0.010 0.030 0.116 
  (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.007) (0.006)*** (0.016)*** 
 Region -0.005 -0.013 0.001 -0.006 -0.017 -0.001 -0.006 -0.003 -0.004 
  (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.001) (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002) (0.003)** (0.003) (0.004) 
 Size  0.065 0.114 0.137 0.064 0.127 0.134 0.066 0.074 0.121 
  (0.005)*** (0.004)*** (0.007)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.008)*** (0.010)*** (0.007)*** (0.021)*** 
 Type of collective agreement -0.042 0.074 0.095 -0.023 0.087 0.087 -0.075 0.018 0.167 
  (0.006)*** (0.004)*** (0.009)*** (0.006)*** (0.005)*** (0.010)*** (0.011)*** (0.008)** (0.027)*** 
Coefficients Age  -0.002 0.055 0.164 -0.016 -0.101 -0.261 0.035 0.093 0.162 
  (0.028) (0.019)*** (0.021)*** (0.017) (0.013)*** (0.021)*** (0.029) (0.023)*** (0.044)*** 
 Education  0.227 0.068 -0.141 -0.106 -0.095 0.150 0.174 0.145 -0.134 
  (0.038)*** (0.021)*** (0.022)*** (0.015)*** (0.013)*** (0.029)*** (0.060)*** (0.032)*** (0.065)** 
 Tenure 0.255 0.268 0.327 0.088 0.148 0.191 0.025 -0.008 0.579 
  (0.023)*** (0.016)*** (0.023)*** (0.018)*** (0.015)*** (0.023)*** (0.036) (0.043) (0.143)*** 
 Contract 0.050 0.032 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.008)*** (0.005)*** (0.007)*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 Full-/part-time 0.052 -0.000 0.048 -0.030 -0.047 0.001 0.043 0.016 0.073 
  (0.022)** (0.012) (0.017)*** (0.049) (0.030) (0.041) (0.013)*** (0.008)* (0.018)*** 
 Supervisory tasks  0.000 0.005 -0.034 0.018 0.001 -0.045 -0.002 0.001 -0.012 
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.008)*** (0.004)*** (0.004) (0.009)*** (0.005) (0.004) (0.011) 
 Occupation 0.077 -0.039 -0.032 0.037 -0.046 -0.017 0.060 0.034 -0.006 
  (0.015)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.019)* (0.008)*** (0.006)*** (0.017)*** (0.010)*** (0.018) 
 Region -0.005 0.009 -0.030 -0.017 0.011 -0.032 0.086 0.019 0.007 
  (0.008) (0.006) (0.010)*** (0.009)* (0.007) (0.012)*** (0.014)*** (0.010)* (0.032) 
 Size  0.011 -0.063 -0.029 0.037 -0.073 -0.024 0.056 -0.042 -0.263 
  (0.019) (0.019)*** (0.019) (0.031) (0.020)*** (0.022) (0.044) (0.024)* (0.101)*** 
 Type of collective agreement 0.068 0.067 0.013 0.126 0.040 0.022 0.043 0.033 -0.050 
  (0.015)*** (0.010)*** (0.016) (0.019)*** (0.011)*** (0.018) (0.025)* (0.020) (0.032) 
 Constant -0.495 -0.281 -0.528 0.156 0.257 -0.181 -0.405 -0.148 -0.554 
  (0.058)*** (0.037)*** (0.047)*** (0.075)** (0.052)*** (0.073)** (0.100)*** (0.070)** (0.202)*** 
N  89,953 89,953 89,953 71,428 71,428 71,428 18,525 18,525 18,525 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 6. 
Decomposition of the public-private sector wage differentials. Quantiles and the Fortin-Lemieux-Firpo technique. Women. 
  All  Permanent contract holders  Fixed-term contract holders  
  10th 
percentile 
Median 
90th 
percentile  
10th 
percentile  
Median 
90th 
percentile  
10th 
percentile  
Median 
90th 
percentile  
Total Public sector 2.080 2.526 3.085 2.168 2.574 3.115 1.931 2.399 3.001 
  (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.010)*** (0.007)*** (0.008)*** (0.012)*** (0.014)*** (0.011)*** (0.018)*** 
 Private sector 1.651 1.997 2.703 1.663 2.024 2.740 1.602 1.906 2.445 
  (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.008)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.009)*** (0.008)*** (0.007)*** (0.023)*** 
 Differential  0.429 0.529 0.383 0.506 0.550 0.375 0.329 0.493 0.555 
  (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.013)*** (0.008)*** (0.009)*** (0.015)*** (0.016)*** (0.013)*** (0.029)*** 
 Characteristics  0.127 0.285 0.564 0.150 0.344 0.614 0.198 0.239 0.356 
  (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.017)*** (0.008)*** (0.009)*** (0.020)*** (0.021)*** (0.014)*** (0.039)*** 
 Coefficients 0.301 0.244 -0.181 0.355 0.205 -0.239 0.131 0.254 0.199 
  (0.009)*** (0.008)*** (0.020)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.023)*** (0.028)*** (0.015)*** (0.036)*** 
Characteristics Age  0.004 0.004 0.034 0.007 0.007 0.048 0.004 0.000 0.008 
  (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.004)*** (0.003)** (0.003)*** (0.005)*** (0.003) (0.002) (0.007) 
 Education  0.018 0.064 0.130 0.016 0.061 0.120 0.028 0.098 0.130 
  (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.006)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.007)*** (0.005)*** (0.006)*** (0.016)*** 
 Tenure 0.034 0.054 0.115 0.046 0.078 0.137 0.031 0.029 0.074 
  (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.007)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.009)*** (0.007)*** (0.005)*** (0.015)*** 
 Contract -0.008 -0.005 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 Full-/part-time 0.007 0.003 0.001 0.004 0.008 0.011 0.033 -0.001 -0.037 
  (0.002)*** (0.002)* (0.004) (0.003)* (0.002)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)*** (0.004) (0.010)*** 
 Supervisory tasks  -0.000 -0.001 -0.003 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 
  (0.000)* (0.001)** (0.002)* (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
 Occupation 0.027 0.050 0.068 0.029 0.057 0.073 0.032 0.033 0.052 
  (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.006)*** (0.005)*** (0.010)*** 
 Region -0.003 -0.009 -0.009 -0.002 -0.011 -0.012 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 
  (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)* (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
 Size  0.060 0.082 0.145 0.057 0.094 0.175 0.082 0.058 0.023 
  (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.009)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.009)*** (0.011)*** (0.008)*** (0.021) 
 Type of collective agreement -0.012 0.042 0.075 -0.008 0.050 0.061 -0.013 0.024 0.108 
  (0.005)*** (0.004)*** (0.011)*** (0.005) (0.005)*** (0.013)*** (0.014) (0.009)*** (0.020)*** 
Coefficients Age  -0.011 0.002 -0.010 0.004 -0.028 -0.025 0.012 -0.015 0.130 
  (0.019) (0.014) (0.023) (0.011) (0.012)** (0.023) (0.027) (0.020) (0.074)* 
 Education  0.300 0.133 -0.141 -0.124 -0.399 -0.465 0.031 0.167 0.023 
  (0.043)*** (0.020)*** (0.030)*** (0.016)*** (0.014)*** (0.023)*** (0.022) (0.022)*** (0.090) 
 Tenure -0.090 -0.088 0.016 0.130 0.184 0.386 -0.175 -0.280 -0.006 
  (0.012)*** (0.014)*** (0.032) (0.015)*** (0.016)*** (0.035)*** (0.053)*** (0.069)*** (0.255) 
 Contract 0.018 0.008 -0.009 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 Full-/part-time 0.072 0.013 -0.005 0.021 0.000 -0.017 0.062 0.017 0.033 
  (0.011)*** (0.007)* (0.012) (0.018) (0.013) (0.021) (0.010)*** (0.006)*** (0.013)*** 
 Supervisory tasks  0.001 0.007 -0.011 0.003 0.014 -0.013 0.006 -0.006 -0.014 
  (0.002) (0.002)*** (0.006)* (0.002) (0.003)*** (0.008) (0.003)** (0.004) (0.011) 
 Occupation 0.063 -0.033 -0.076 0.056 -0.044 -0.078 0.050 0.013 -0.022 
  (0.012)*** (0.007)*** (0.010)*** (0.015)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.017)*** (0.010) (0.022) 
 Region 0.004 -0.014 -0.028 -0.015 -0.024 -0.038 0.056 -0.010 -0.003 
  (0.006) (0.006)** (0.013)** (0.007)** (0.008)*** (0.012)*** (0.011)*** (0.011) (0.033) 
 Size  0.007 -0.004 -0.095 -0.002 -0.019 -0.122 -0.008 0.004 0.045 
  (0.021) (0.023) (0.022)*** (0.025) (0.021) (0.034)*** (0.018) (0.032) (0.025)* 
 Type of collective agreement 0.053 0.033 0.030 0.040 0.039 0.037 0.039 0.037 0.043 
  (0.010)*** (0.006)*** (0.011)*** (0.010)*** (0.008)*** (0.014)*** (0.019)** (0.011)*** (0.020)** 
 Constant -0.115 0.186 0.148 0.243 0.482 0.096 0.058 0.327 -0.029 
  (0.060)* (0.038)*** (0.061)** (0.048)*** (0.039)*** (0.068) (0.083) (0.083)*** (0.274) 
N  67,821 67,821 67,821 52,239 52,239 52,239 15,582 15,582 15,582 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 7. 
Decomposition of the public-private sector wage differentials. Wage inequality (Gini coefficient) and the Fortin-Lemieux-Firpo technique.  
  Male  Male: permanent  
Male: 
fixed-term  Female 
Female: 
permanent 
Female: 
fixed-term  
Total Public sector  0.089 0.080 0.104 0.089 0.081 0.099 
  (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
 Private sector  0.109 0.109 0.100 0.109 0.110 0.096 
  (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** 
 Differential  -0.020 -0.029 0.004 -0.020 -0.029 0.003 
  (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)* (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.002) 
 Characteristics  0.025 0.016 0.042 0.028 0.029 0.008 
  (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.004)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)** 
 Coefficients -0.045 -0.046 -0.038 -0.048 -0.058 -0.005 
  (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.005)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.004) 
Characteristics  Age  0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.004 -0.000 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)* (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001) 
 Education  0.004 0.003 0.004 0.007 0.007 0.005 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.002)* (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** 
 Tenure  0.002 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.004 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)* (0.001)** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
 Contract  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 
  (0.000)*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)*** (0.000) (0.000) 
 Employment type (full-/part-time) -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.007 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000) (0.000)** (0.000) (0.001)*** 
 Supervisory tasks  -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)** (0.000) (0.000)* (0.000) (0.000) 
 Occupation  0.003 0.002 0.011 0.002 0.002 0.001 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.002)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001) 
 Region 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)*** (0.000) 
 Size  0.001 0.000 0.003 0.004 0.006 -0.006 
  (0.001)* (0.001) (0.002)* (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** 
 Type of collective agreement 0.012 0.009 0.019 0.008 0.006 0.010 
  (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.003)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** 
Coefficients Age  0.013 -0.017 0.012 -0.001 -0.000 0.006 
  (0.003)*** (0.002)*** (0.004)*** (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
 Education  -0.035 0.023 -0.039 -0.044 -0.019 -0.009 
  (0.003)*** (0.002)*** (0.007)*** (0.004)*** (0.002)*** (0.005)* 
 Tenure 0.001 0.003 0.051 0.009 0.015 0.026 
  (0.003) (0.002) (0.015)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.019) 
 Contract  -0.003 0.000 0.000 -0.003 0.000 0.000 
  (0.001)*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)*** (0.000) (0.000) 
 Employment type (full-/part-time) 0.000 0.002 0.002 -0.009 -0.006 -0.002 
  (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.001) 
 Supervisory tasks  -0.003 -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
  (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001) (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
 Occupation  -0.007 -0.002 -0.007 -0.010 -0.009 -0.007 
  (0.001)*** (0.001)* (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** 
 Region -0.004 -0.002 -0.008 -0.004 -0.002 -0.005 
  (0.001)*** (0.001)** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.001) (0.004) 
 Size -0.006 -0.002 -0.011 -0.007 -0.009 0.005 
  (0.002)*** (0.002) (0.004)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)* 
 Type of collective agreement -0.009 -0.009 -0.007 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 
  (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)** (0.001)*** (0.001)* (0.002) 
 Constant 0.007 -0.037 -0.029 0.025 -0.023 -0.014 
  (0.006) (0.007)*** (0.019) (0.007)*** (0.006)*** (0.022) 
N  89,953 71,428 18,525 67,821 52,239 15,582 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Appendix  
 
Table A.1. 
Descriptive statistics. 
 Men  Women  
 All Permanent  Fixed-term  All Permanent  Fixed-term 
 
Public  
sector 
Private  
sector 
Public  
sector  
Private  
sector  
Public  
sector  
Private  
sector  
Public  
sector  
Private  
sector  
Public  
sector  
Private  
sector  
Public  
sector  
Private  
sector  
Logarithm of hourly wage  2.659 2.306 2.723 2.345 2.462 2.148 2.558 2.095 2.620 2.122 2.434 1.974 
Age: less than 30  0.150 0.295 0.108 0.262 0.280 0.429 0.162 0.354 0.083 0.319 0.322 0.507 
Age: between 30 and 45  0.488 0.475 0.486 0.500 0.493 0.371 0.501 0.471 0.501 0.494 0.502 0.367 
Age: more than 45  0.362 0.230 0.406 0.238 0.227 0.200 0.337 0.176 0.416 0.187 0.177 0.125 
Primary education  0.086 0.211 0.072 0.195 0.128 0.277 0.046 0.152 0.037 0.146 0.062 0.180 
Secondary education  0.551 0.615 0.590 0.615 0.432 0.617 0.481 0.607 0.499 0.605 0.445 0.616 
Tertiary education  0.363 0.174 0.338 0.190 0.440 0.107 0.473 0.241 0.463 0.249 0.494 0.203 
Full-time  0.929 0.894 0.984 0.922 0.760 0.778 0.904 0.650 0.960 0.690 0.791 0.469 
Tenure: 3 years or less  0.221 0.390 0.116 0.282 0.543 0.832 0.254 0.467 0.126 0.371 0.512 0.891 
Tenure: between 4 and 10 years  0.245 0.322 0.226 0.381 0.304 0.083 0.257 0.338 0.212 0.396 0.348 0.081 
Tenure: between 11 and 20 years  0.230 0.170 0.272 0.207 0.104 0.021 0.234 0.131 0.294 0.158 0.114 0.011 
Tenure: more than 20 years  0.304 0.117 0.387 0.131 0.048 0.064 0.254 0.064 0.368 0.075 0.026 0.017 
Permanent contract 0.754 0.803 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.669 0.816 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Supervisory tasks  0.193 0.214 0.223 0.243 0.100 0.097 0.143 0.153 0.172 0.170 0.083 0.078 
Skilled occupations  0.576 0.371 0.558 0.404 0.630 0.235 0.749 0.472 0.767 0.492 0.711 0.386 
Semi-skilled occupations  0.357 0.542 0.392 0.525 0.252 0.613 0.187 0.377 0.180 0.370 0.200 0.408 
Unskilled occupations  0.067 0.087 0.050 0.071 0.118 0.152 0.065 0.150 0.053 0.138 0.089 0.205 
Size: less than 10 0.017 0.287 0.016 0.280 0.019 0.317 0.007 0.329 0.006 0.332 0.009 0.316 
Size: between 10 and 49 0.084 0.317 0.080 0.317 0.097 0.314 0.058 0.239 0.051 0.238 0.073 0.248 
Size: between 50 and 199 0.163 0.189 0.154 0.186 0.189 0.201 0.125 0.184 0.117 0.178 0.142 0.211 
Size: 200 or more  0.736 0.207 0.750 0.216 0.695 0.168 0.810 0.247 0.827 0.252 0.776 0.226 
National collective agreement for sector 0.027 0.276 0.029 0.291 0.021 0.217 0.035 0.337 0.033 0.337 0.038 0.335 
Sub-national collective agreement for sector  0.100 0.561 0.088 0.541 0.135 0.641 0.120 0.525 0.120 0.521 0.122 0.543 
Establishment-level collective agreement  0.873 0.163 0.883 0.168 0.844 0.141 0.845 0.138 0.847 0.141 0.840 0.122 
Number of observations 10,067 79,886 7,375 64,053 2,692 15,833 13,349 54,472 8,288 43,951 5,061 10,521 
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